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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, individuals have the legal right to choose their
friends, spouses, and many other sorts of associates on whatever grounds
they like. No law forbids them from discriminating in these choices on
the basis of race, gender, religion, sexual preference, or any other
traditionally “suspect” category. Moreover, most people seem to believe
that individuals ought to have the legal right to discriminate in these
ways.1 Morally, we might find a person who chooses friends or spouses
only from among a certain race to be anything from shallow to
* University of San Diego, Department of Philosophy. I would like to thank the
organizers and participants of the “Rights and Wrongs of Discrimination,” a symposium
hosted by the University of San Diego Institute for Law and Philosophy, for asking me to
write this paper and for their helpful feedback on its arguments. I especially thank
Donald Dripps and Chris Wonnell for their generous and insightful comments.
1. This is the case, I believe, even when we view the discrimination as morally
wrongful. Thus, throughout this essay, I will use the term discrimination to refer
specifically to morally wrongful discrimination.
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repugnant. But this moral condemnation of her conduct does not affect
our judgment that she ought to have a legal right to engage in it. Thus,
even while we make a moral judgment condemning her conduct, we
make another moral judgment that legal institutions ought not punish it.
Things are different in the world of commerce. Many employers are
forbidden from discriminating in their hiring practices on the basis of
race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.2 For current employees,
promotion and pay decisions are also subject to federal antidiscrimination
regulations. And many of the ways in which businesses are forbidden
from discriminating against employees or potential employees also
extend to their treatment of other groups. For instance, the Federal Civil
Rights Acts3 prohibit racial discrimination in independent contractor
relationships and bar businesses that are deemed public accommodations
from discriminating against customers on various grounds. Not only are
federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination within businesses
ubiquitous, but they are also generally the subject of moral approval.
Most people make the moral judgment that laws ought to exist barring
businesses from discriminating in these sorts of ways.
In this Article I examine the disparity between attitudes toward
regulating private discrimination and those concerning the regulation of
what I will call “commercial” discrimination. My hope is to find a
theory that can simultaneously explain these divergent attitudes by
providing an account that fits the various aspects of our legal practices
and our attitudes toward them, and justify those practices by providing
an account that makes the divergence attractive from a moral point of
view.4 I focus on an explanation of the disparity that is grounded in
three different sorts of considerations: differences in our epistemological
access to private and commercial discrimination, different effects these
forms of discrimination have on their victims, and differences in the
relative importance of the value of autonomy at stake. I conclude that
while considerations of autonomy provide the best explanation for the
disparity in attitudes toward the legal treatment of discrimination, they
still fall well short of an explanation that completely fits and justifies our
current practice. The account I defend is thus revisionist in that it will
2. For an overview of employment discrimination law in the United States, see
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-11 (2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
4. Throughout this paper, I will generally use the terms explain and explanation
in a broad sense, referring to an account or the provision of an account that both fits and
justifies a practice in the senses described above, reserving use of the terms justify and
justification for those instances where I want to place special emphasis on the moral
evaluation of a practice or attitude. The task of this project, then, is to look for an
explanation that plays the role of an interpretation, in Dworkin’s sense. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986).
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suggest that for our practice toward discrimination to be a coherent
whole, it must be modified in significant ways. Specifically, I suggest
that the disparity between our current legal treatment of private versus
commercial discrimination is based on what I believe to be a mistaken
belief about the greater importance of autonomy in the private realm
than in the commercial sphere. Because this belief is mistaken, a practice
designed to consistently respect the value of autonomy ought to
differentiate less between private and commercial discrimination, either
by regulating the former more heavily, or by regulating the latter less
heavily.
II. EPISTEMOLOGY
One possible reason for regulating commercial and private discrimination
differently is that the former might be easier and less costly to detect
than the latter. This approach leaves open the possibility that both forms
of discrimination are equally wrong from a moral point of view. The
decision not to prosecute individuals for private discrimination is made not
on the grounds that such discrimination is not wrongful, but rather on the
grounds that the epistemic hurdles to discovering such discrimination
make it a poor target for legal regulation.
There are several things to be said in favor of this argument. First,
any kind of discrimination, whether private or commercial, has the
potential to manifest in a great variety of forms, and this can make its
detection difficult. One individual might choose friends of only a certain
race, while another might have friends of all races but treat those friends
in subtly different ways depending on the race to which they belong.
Some individuals will discriminate consciously, perhaps even proudly,
while others might be surprised to learn that they are discriminating at
all. The fact that discrimination can take so many shapes makes it
difficult to know what to look for, and this means that the epistemic
hurdle is already set fairly high for all types of discrimination.
But private discrimination does set additional epistemic barriers to
regulation, for it often manifests in the most intimate choices of an
individual, choices about which the individual alone may have
information, and which she is not typically called upon to justify to
others in any sort of written or documented form. The reasons for an
individual’s choice of romantic partners, for instance, are often and at
best known only to that individual. She is not called upon to provide
any publicly accessible record of her choice; indeed, she might not
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discuss the reasons behind her choice with anyone at all, her romantic
partner included.
This private context stands in stark contrast to the way certain
economic decisions are made in large corporations, especially hiring and
promotion decisions. In these decisions, two factors tend to make the
detection of discrimination easier. First, more people tend to be involved in
commercial decisionmaking. The bureaucratic structure of corporations
generally entails that more than one person will be involved with, or at
least have knowledge of, decisions that significantly affect the interest of
the corporation. The more people that have knowledge of discriminatory
decisions, the more sources of information investigators will have.
Second, corporate decisions often leave a “paper trail” at which investigators
can look to determine whether discrimination occurred. Hiring decisions,
for instance, involve at a minimum the resumes and other documents
submitted with each candidate’s application. They might also involve
emails between key decisionmakers, records of meetings held to discuss
the candidates, and similar sorts of documents. Of course, discriminatory
corporate decisionmakers are unlikely to document the fact that they
rejected a candidate’s application on wrongfully discriminatory grounds.
Nevertheless, even if the documents do not provide any explicit statements
of discriminatory intent, they can support a prosecution by providing
evidence of the candidates’ objective qualifications for the job, records of
features considered (and not considered) by the decisionmaker, and so
forth. This sort of hard evidence makes prosecution of discrimination in
the corporate context much easier than it would be in a case involving
private discrimination.
The difference in the law’s stance toward discrimination in large
versus small places of employment provides a final point in support of
the claim that epistemic considerations are what distinguish the legal
treatment of private discrimination from the treatment of commercial
discrimination. While federal law prohibits discrimination by large
employers, it does not prohibit such discrimination by small employers.5
The kinds of epistemic considerations I have been discussing provide a
plausible justification for this disparity. Hiring decisions made by small
employers are more likely to involve a single person than those made by
larger employers. Furthermore, the bureaucratic requirements of
documenting and justifying decisions are likely to be less of a factor for
small employers. If a single person is in charge of hiring decisions and
is not required to maintain any documentation of the reasons behind her
decisions, investigators are likely to have a difficult time establishing
that wrongful discrimination has taken place in all but the most blatant
5.
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cases. On this argument, then, small employers are thus legally free to
discriminate for the same reason that private individuals are—because it
would be too difficult to gain the information necessary to prove their
discrimination in a court of law.
However, for all there is to be said in favor of epistemic considerations as
one factor distinguishing the legal regulation of commercial and private
discrimination, I do not think we can conclude that they are the sole
factor for at least four reasons.
First, epistemic considerations cannot be the only reason for the
absence of legal regulation of private discrimination because the same
epistemic considerations pervade other areas of private life which are
subject to legal regulation. The most obvious instances in recent history
are the prohibitions imposed by many states against sodomy, even when
it occurs within the privacy of the actor’s own home.6 The fact that it is
extremely difficult for the state to gather information about the
occurrence of sodomitic acts was no obstacle to their ban, and arguments
about such considerations appear to have played little or no role in the
repeal of such statues when they have been repealed.7 Further examples
of laws prohibiting difficult-to-detect behavior can be multiplied indefinitely:
drug use, various forms of tax evasion, polygamy, and so on.8 For better
or for worse, the law’s ignorance seems to be no deterrent to its taking
action.
Second, while it is certainly true that it is difficult to gather information
about some forms of private discrimination, there are many instances of
private discrimination about which information is readily available.
Some individuals are outspoken about their racial, religious, or other
biases. Some even go so far as to document their biases in writing. Epistemic
considerations would present little barrier to the legal regulation of at
least these more overt forms of discrimination.
The third reason epistemic considerations cannot be the sole grounds
for differentiating between commercial and private discrimination is
6. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
7. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for instance, is based almost entirely
on the liberty interest of individuals to control their intimate lives, and makes no mention
of the sort of epistemological considerations discussed here.
8. Laws regulating or prohibiting difficult-to-detect consumption or trade of
certain opiates and narcotics, for instance, exist at the state, federal, and international
levels. See, for example, the Harrison Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, or the 1988
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-4 (1989), 1582 U.N.T.S. 164.
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simply the flip side of the second. Not only is private discrimination
sometimes easy to detect, but commercial discrimination is often difficult to
detect. Proving discriminatory intent, or even adverse effect, can be difficult,
especially in an era where managers have been exhaustively socialized
to be sensitive to the wrongness of discrimination and are likely to take
great pains to cover their tracks should they engage in discriminatory
behavior.9
Finally, the idea that disparate legal stances toward private and
commercial discrimination are based on epistemic considerations alone
depends on an incorrect assumption about the purpose of law. Lack of
epistemic access to a type of behavior might be a definitive reason to not
legally regulate that behavior if considerations of effective enforcement
were central to the justification of legal regulation. But while such
considerations might be important, they are not central. Legal regulations
can serve an important role, even if they are very difficult to enforce, by
sending a message to the public that they ought not engage in a certain
behavior.10 For most individuals most of the time, receipt of this
message will be enough to give them a reason not to engage in the
prohibited behavior, regardless of the likelihood that their disobedience
would be successfully detected and prosecuted. It is therefore arguable
that this expressive, or communicative, aspect of law is even more
central to our understanding of law’s function than the enforcement
aspect. Thus, the fact that private discrimination is not legally regulated
cannot be adequately explained by epistemic difficulties, for by regulating
private discrimination, the law could effectively send a message of
disapproval regarding such behavior, regardless of whether its regulations
could be effectively enforced. That it chooses not to do so must be
explained by other considerations.
III. EFFECTS ON THE VICTIM
If the disparity between the legal regulation of commercial discrimination
and the complete lack of regulation of private discrimination cannot be
explained by epistemic considerations, perhaps it can be explained by
differences in the way these types of discrimination affect their victims.
In other words, perhaps the reason that commercial discrimination is
regulated while private discrimination is not is that the former causes
more serious harm to its victims than the latter.
9. See HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 59-107, for a discussion of these difficulties.
10. See, for example, H.L.A. Hart’s discussion of the way in which enforcement of
the criminal law via prosecution is indicative of a failure of the law to perform its
primary purpose of guiding and controlling life outside of the courtroom. H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38-42 (2d ed. 1994).
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Commercial discrimination causes two distinct sorts of harm. The
most obvious harm, and the most obvious ground on which to
distinguish commercial from private discrimination, is a lack of access
to a certain kind of good—in this case, the full range of goods provided
by commercial exchange. Let us call these benefit harms. Someone who is
denied a job because of a discriminatory hiring decision, for instance,
loses out on the wages she would have earned at that job, the knowledge
she might have acquired from the work, and the pleasure of engaging in
meaningful work of that particular sort. A firm that is denied a contracting
position because of a discriminatory decision is denied the monetary
benefits of that position, the opportunity to possibly expand the business,
and so on. Customers who are discriminated against by businesses lose
the opportunity to buy the products they desire.
The second sort of harm inflicted by commercial discrimination has
less to do with the lost benefits of commercial exchanges than with the
message communicated by the act of discrimination itself. Discrimination,
according to many arguments, is a way of failing to respect an
individual—what we can call a respect harm. What precisely is meant
by this claim will vary with the argument under consideration. What
such arguments tend to have in common, however, is that they consider
the wrongness of discrimination to be a matter of treating the victim as
being unworthy in some respect.11 For instance, some arguments claim
that discrimination signals that the actor views the victim as being of a
lower moral status—of being less worthy of consideration and care than
the agent herself or than other members of society.12
However, respect harm only occurs when discrimination is based on
what Larry Alexander has called a “bias,” and not all forms of wrongful
discrimination involve biases.13 Some forms of wrongful discrimination
are based instead on prejudices. And prejudices do not necessarily
involve viewing the victim as bearing a lower moral status. Instead,
prejudice involves judging an individual to possess a certain characteristic
based solely on his possession of some other characteristic such as

11. For an example of such an argument, see Paul Woodruff, What’s Wrong with
Discrimination?, 36 ANALYSIS 158, 158-60 (1976).
12. Michael Blake, in this volume, claims that some sorts of discrimination can
send a message of “social inferiority and internalized shame.” Michael Blake, The
Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017, 1030 (2006).
13. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158-63 (1992).
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membership in a certain racial group.14 Discrimination based on prejudice
can still be disrespectful to the victim because it can still convey to her
that she is unworthy, but the sense of unworthiness involved with
prejudice is more limited. Discrimination based on bias proclaims the
victim to be worthy of less moral concern and care because of her group
membership. In contrast, discrimination based on prejudice proclaims
the victim to be unworthy of the job because of her supposed possession
of some undesirable characteristic, or lack of possession of some
desirable characteristic, for which her membership in the group is evidence.
The case could be made that commercial discrimination creates more
serious benefit harms than private discrimination. People need jobs to
survive. Travelers need to be able to find hotels that will rent them a
room. Being denied an education can set back not only the individual
who is denied, but that individual’s family as well. Considering that
individuals who lose these needed goods due to discrimination suffer in
serious ways, it is easy to assume that the costs of personal discrimination
are less severe. However, there are three reasons why this is not clearly
so.
First, the benefit harms caused by commercial discrimination might
not always be as high as I have suggested. The purported harmfulness of
commercial discrimination is generally based on the value of the good
that is denied. Jobs, lodging, and access to education are undoubtedly
important. But the effect of commercial discrimination on a victim depends
not just upon the value of the denied good, it depends also upon the
available options for obtaining that good elsewhere. A thirsty man’s
interest in getting a drink of water is not seriously set back by a broken
drinking fountain if a working one is just a block away. Likewise, even
if the value of a job lost due to discrimination is high, the magnitude of
the benefit harm suffered by the victim will be small if another equally
good job is available to her. Thus, the degree of benefit harm caused by
commercial discrimination depends on how widespread that discrimination
is, whether most other businesses discriminate on the same grounds,
whether the discrimination takes place in all contexts or only in certain
ones, and so forth.15 As discrimination becomes rarer, the benefit harm
of any token of discrimination becomes less severe.
14. See id. at 167-74 (referring to prejudicial discrimination as “discrimination
based on proxy traits”).
15. This point is widely acknowledged in the literature surrounding the wrongness
of discrimination. See, e.g., id. (“If [discriminatory preferences] are idiosyncratic and
variable, uncommon, or context-specific—‘I’m uncomfortable around Italians in my
private club but not at work’—rather than categorical—‘I prefer to avoid Jews in all
contexts’—and do not disprefer the already relatively disadvantaged, their adverse social
effects may be relatively minimal.”). Similarly, Kimberly Yuracko notes that “[i]rrational but
idiosyncratic discrimination is less harmful—both to individuals and socially salient
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It is plausible, then, to suppose that the benefit harms imposed by
some forms of commercial discrimination are fairly low. For example,
if a small employer in a major metropolitan area like Atlanta decides to
discriminate against white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants in his hiring, the
benefit harm will be almost nil, even if the quality of the jobs he is
offering is terrific. As beneficial as the jobs might be, the victims are
likely to have numerous other options. Atlanta has many equally terrific
jobs, and most employers likely do not discriminate against white,
Anglo-Saxon Protestants.
Second, even if the benefit harms imposed by commercial discrimination
are more severe than those imposed by private discrimination, it is still
possible that private discrimination imposes greater respect harms.
There is pressure in a market economy for businesses to base important
personnel decisions on factors directly relevant to the maximization of
profit, and to base their decisions on only such factors. This could lead
to employment discrimination against members of certain groups if
managers are prejudiced against those groups—if they believe that
members of those groups possess certain other characteristics that are
relevant to their ability to contribute to the firm’s profit. This pressure
could also cause discrimination due to “reaction qualifications” if
managers are concerned about the way in which their discriminating
customers or stockholders will react to their employment of members of
the group in question.16 But the effect of outright biases—simple dislike
for members of another group—is likely to be checked by the pressure
of a competitive market to base decisions exclusively on considerations
of profit.
Victims of discrimination in the commercial sphere are thus, ceteris
paribus, more likely to be victims of prejudice than of bias. And it
seems plausible to suppose that to the extent this is true, victims of
commercial discrimination will suffer less in the way of respect harms
because discrimination based on prejudice does not amount to a lack of
respect for the victim as such, in the way that discrimination based on
bias does. Job candidates who are rejected because of prejudice are not
groups—than irrational and systemic discrimination.” Kimberly Yuracko, Sameness,
Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More Complete Theory of Employment
Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2006); see also Mark Kelman, Defining
the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006) (describing
the context-sensitive nature of the injuries caused by discrimination).
16. See Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99,
99-101 (1983).
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rejected because their potential employer views them as less worthy of
respect or inherently morally inferior. They are rejected because their
employer believes, perhaps falsely, perhaps correctly, that their membership
in a certain group is evidence of their possession of some other profitaffecting trait. The rejection is not of the candidate as a person, but of
the candidate as the supposed possessor of some undesirable trait.17
Indeed, it will often be a trait that the victim herself would find undesirable.
In these cases, the candidate can possibly find some detachment from the
discrimination, and perhaps even partially and imperfectly sympathize
with it. Even while offended at being seen as undesirable for the job, it
would still be possible for the victim to think, “If I were deciding who to
hire and believed that I had evidence that a candidate was lazy,
potentially violent, and so on, I would not hire them either.”
Thus, even while the benefit harms of commercial discrimination
might be greater than those imposed by private discrimination, the latter
might impose greater respect harms than the former. And such harms
can be significant. The feeling of social isolation that results from
private discrimination can be psychologically devastating. This is especially
true for children, who are particularly prone to question their own selfworth in reaction to discrimination from their peers, but the effects hold
for adults as well. Private discrimination can have a tremendous impact
on the psychological well-being of even the most self-assured adults.
As is the case with commercial discrimination, the magnitude of the
harm caused by private discrimination will depend on the extent to
which the discrimination is widely practiced, in a variety of contexts,
and so forth. But the nature of the dependency will often differ. In
commercial discrimination, the primary form of harm resulting from
discrimination is benefit harm—commercial discrimination prevents
individuals from realizing the various goods of commercial exchange.
17. One could, I suppose, push on this argument by claiming that racial biases do
not amount to a rejection of the person qua person either, but simply a rejection of the
person as possessor of a certain racial/gender/religious trait. Does it follow that victims
of biases are thus not disrespected? I think not. The traits which the discriminating
manager is trying to avoid in cases of prejudice are very often those about which there
exists a good deal of consensus regarding their “badness,” such that it is likely that even
the victim of prejudicial discrimination will herself view those characteristics as bad and
alien to herself. The traits targeted by biases, however, are generally not viewed as bad
by the people who hold those traits, and are indeed often held to be a valuable part of
their personal identity. Thus, if you refuse to associate with me because you believe that
I am violent, I will probably at least partially sympathize with your motives, since I share
a desire to disassociate myself from violent people. But if you refuse to associate with
me because I am black, I will be offended because I do not view my blackness as a trait
that merits such a response; rather, I view my blackness as part of who I am, and I
therefore regard your rejection of my blackness as partly a rejection of me, and of a part
of me which I value.
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Benefit harms can be minimized if there are a variety of alternative
sources available from which the victim can secure the benefit in
question. But it is not so clear that the respect harms caused by private
discrimination function in the same way. A child who is socially
excluded by a discriminatory group of peers at school does not negate
this harm entirely by finding another group of individuals that will
accept her. She might negate the benefit harm of the first group’s
discrimination—they denied her the good of friendship, but she was able
to realize that good elsewhere—but the disrespect they have done to her
remains. The harmful stigmatization, or respect harm, that results from
discrimination is not merely a matter of being denied access to some
good, it is a positive evil that cannot simply be erased by the addition of
other goods. The fact that respect harms cannot be “balanced out” by
the addition of other goods is one way in which such harms are even
worse than the benefit harms characteristic of commercial discrimination.
Finally, it is not at all clear that the benefit harms of commercial
discrimination are indeed greater than those of private discrimination.
Glenn Loury, for instance, argues that private “discrimination in contact”
can be even more damaging to minorities’ long-term socioeconomic
status than the formal “discrimination in contract” that takes place in the
commercial sphere.18 The most compelling reason for thinking that he is
right is found in the phenomenon of assortative marriage. Alan Wertheimer,
in his contribution to this volume, makes a compelling case that
assortative marriage—the tendency of individuals to marry individuals who
are like them in certain relevant respects—can, in conjunction with
private discrimination of various kinds, yield socioeconomic consequences
that significantly affect numerous groups and individuals for generations.19
This is especially so in a country like the United States, with a long
history of racial discrimination against certain minority groups and a
relatively high degree of socioeconomic inequality among the relevant
ethnic groups.
Blacks, for instance, have a much lower socioeconomic status on
average than whites. If, as Wertheimer notes, “blacks and whites
married each other without respect to race, in which case most whites
would marry whites and most blacks would also marry whites, racial
inequality as such would vanish within a generation, although class
18. See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 95-96 (2002).
19. See Alan Wertheimer, Reflections on Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
945, 954 (2006).
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inequality would remain.”20 However, blacks and whites do not marry
each other without respect to race; racial intermarriage between blacks
and whites is, in fact, still relatively rare.21 The cause of this need not be
racial discrimination as such. Persons tend to mate with individuals who
share similar cultural backgrounds, educational levels, economic status,
and so forth.22 Given that these traits are unequally divided among racial
groups, racially assortative mating is likely to occur even without the
contribution of racial discrimination. Still, discrimination undoubtedly
plays a role, and to the extent that patterns of assortative mating are the
result of that discrimination, it is fair to blame private discrimination for
at least a part in perpetuating inequality between the races, and all the
ills associated with it. These are very serious harms indeed.
I do not think it is plausible, then, to suppose that the difference
between the legal regulation of private versus commercial discrimination
can be adequately explained by the allegedly greater harm imposed by
the latter. For I do not think it is true that the harms of commercial
discrimination are necessarily, or even typically, greater than the harms
of private discrimination.
IV. AUTONOMY
The last, and I believe most plausible, explanation of the difference
between the legal treatment of private versus commercial discrimination
is based on the idea of a sphere of personal autonomy. On this theory, it
is wrong to regulate private discrimination because the kind of activity it
involves falls within an area in which individuals should be free to act as
they choose, even if their actions are morally wrong. Commercial
discrimination, however, and commercial activity in general, falls outside
of this protected sphere. Therefore, even if both forms of discrimination
are equally wrongful, commercial discrimination is properly subject to
legal regulation and private discrimination is not.
Conceptions of autonomy vary greatly in their details.23 All that is
needed for the current position, however, is a basic understanding with
20. Id. at 957.
21. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census Data on Interracial Marriage, http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractab1.txt (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (demonstrating
that in 1992, interracial marriages in the United States counted for only 2.2% of all
marriages).
22. For a classic economic explanation of why assortative mating occurs, see Gary
Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part 1, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813, 813-46 (1973).
23. See John Christman’s entry on the topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy for a useful overview of the competing conceptions and their relative
merits. John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STAN.
E NCYCLOPEDIA P HILO . 2-3 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2003 ed.), available at
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which we can say that even when A’s discriminatory actions are morally
wrong, it would also be morally wrong for the state to prohibit A from
performing those actions.
The most plausible argument for an understanding of autonomy that
protects private discriminatory actions is one based on the individual’s
interest in being free from state regulation of private activity. Such an
argument would begin by noting the nature and importance of the
interest that individuals have in being free to live their lives without
interference. This sort of argument is commonplace in liberal theorizing,
and probably found its most persuasive expression in John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty.24 According to Mill, each individual has an interest in defining
the contours of her own life.25 This interest of course encompasses
making one’s own decisions on the “big issues” of life, such as whether
and whom to marry, what sort of career to pursue, and whether and what
kind of religious belief and practice to adopt, but it also extends to
smaller matters. The seemingly insignificant aspects of everyday life
are, after all, the stuff of which the grand themes of a life are composed.
Decisions which seem small in themselves—decisions about what sorts
of clothes to wear, what to do in one’s spare time, what style of speech
to use with others—can, in the aggregate, help define one’s self-image
and the image one presents to others. These are matters of tremendous
personal significance.26
The question, then, is whether this interest in individual self-definition
entails an interest in the freedom to engage in morally wrongful private
discrimination. This question cannot be settled merely by looking at the
ways in which people do define themselves as a matter of contingent
fact. It is no doubt true as an empirical claim that many individuals
define themselves partly in virtue of their wrongfully discriminatory
attitudes and behaviors. Klan members and neo-Nazis, to name just two
of the most obvious and extreme examples, often derive a large part of
their self-identity from their discrimination against others. The question,
however, is not whether they can do so but whether they have an interest
in doing so free from state regulation. This question is a moral one, not
a sociological one.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/autonomy-moral (last visited Dec. 20,
2006).
24. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1877).
25. Id. at 100-32.
26. Id.
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I believe that a fairly convincing case can be made for an affirmative
answer to this question along Millian lines. The argument, like Mill’s, is
based on skepticism regarding the ability of government regulators to
acquire or use the knowledge necessary to effectively regulate wrongful
private discrimination.27 This skepticism comes in two forms. The first
is a skepticism regarding the ability of potential regulators to correctly
identify that subcategory of discrimination that is genuinely morally
wrongful. Not all discrimination, of course, is morally wrongful.
Discriminating between productive and unproductive employees, for
example, or between loyal and disloyal friends, is almost certainly
morally admirable, not wrongful. What is it, then, that distinguishes
morally wrongful discrimination from morally benign or praiseworthy
discrimination? Unfortunately, no clear answer to this question appears
to exist. What is certain is that there is no one thing that divides all
cases of morally permissible discrimination from morally impermissible
ones.28 Beyond that, there is little theoretical agreement regarding which
features of discrimination are wrong-making, and how wrong-making
they are.29 Some believe that the consequences of wrongful discrimination
are what make such discrimination wrong, though there is disagreement
regarding what those wrong-making consequences are.30 Others believe
that the wrongfulness of discrimination is a matter of the wrongfulness
of the attitude or intention on which it is based.31 Still others are doubtful
that many of the paradigm cases of discrimination are even wrong at
all.32
All this disagreement about what constitutes wrongful discrimination
exists at the level of theory, but things get even murkier when we move
to the level of practice. Even if we could agree, for instance, that
discrimination is wrongful when it negatively affects the most vulnerable
members of society, it would still be difficult to figure out when this
condition is met. And it would often be equally difficult to discern the
27. See id. at ch. 2 (arguing that government regulators cannot safely censor false
opinions while protecting true ones because they do not know which opinions are true
and which are false). The argument I consider in this section is similarly based on
doubts about the knowledge of government regulators, but extends the subject of their
ignorance in various ways.
28. See Alexander, supra note 13.
29. The diverse array of positions advocated in this volume, fourteen years after
Alexander’s initial stab at the question, are evidence enough of this.
30. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 775, 790 (2006); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Private Discrimination: A
Prioritarian, Desert-Accommodating Account, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 817 (2006).
31. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 192, saying this is at least part of a correct
account of wrongful discrimination.
32. For a qualified version of this argument, see Peter Vallentyne, Left
Libertarianism and Private Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981, 984 (2006).
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intention of a discriminator with the degree of precision and certainty
required for effective regulation. This is especially true when it comes
to the paradigm cases of private discrimination that we think the law
ought not to regulate. How might the would-be regulator know whether
X’s choice of mate, religion, or political associates is motivated by
impermissible animosity or by legitimate, if eccentric, personal tastes?
What sort of investigative powers would be required to find out? And
how well can judges and juries make such fine-grained judgments about
the morality or immorality of these intimate choices?
There is a second sort of Millian skepticism relevant to the present
inquiry. Not only is it unlikely that regulators and enforcers can effectively
distinguish between wrongful and non-wrongful discrimination, it is also
unlikely that they can arrive at universally correct judgments about the
significance of the freedom to engage in discrimination, wrongful or not,
in an individual’s life. It is possible that discriminatory attitudes and
behaviors, while morally wrong in certain respects, nevertheless also
serve some morally praiseworthy goals for the individuals who hold or
practice them. By allowing different individuals to hold and practice
discriminatory attitudes and behaviors to different extents, we allow
them as individuals and society as a whole to learn whether particular
kinds of discrimination are constructive. The mere moral wrongfulness
of an activity does not make it insignificant for an individual’s project of
self-definition.33 And if a discriminatory activity is significant, we
might wish to allow individuals the freedom to engage in it, despite its
wrongness.
Those who defend an autonomy-based right to engage in private
discrimination, then, can argue that even when such discrimination is not
right, from a moral perspective, it need not necessarily violate anyone’s

33. The Boy Scouts of America, for instance, discriminate against homosexuals
and atheists in their membership criteria. But this discrimination, the ability to exclude,
is part and parcel of the ability to define what they are, as an organization. From the
perspective of the group, this freedom to self-define is part of what makes membership
meaningful to its individual members. And from the perspective of a society in which a
plurality of such groups exist, defining themselves along a variety of different lines, this
freedom is what makes a flourishing civil society possible. On the relationship between
freedom of association, discrimination, and civil society, see NANCY ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998). For
a detailed case study of the ways in which groups which are morally objectionable in
some respects can nevertheless provide valuable social goods, see DAVID BEITO, FROM
MUTUAL AID TO WELFARE STATE (2000).

1057

ZWOLINSKI.POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

2/26/2007 1:50:25 PM

moral rights.34 It is proper for the state to use its coercive force to
protect people’s moral rights, the argument could continue, but not to
prevent individuals from acting in a morally wrongful way.35 Indeed, so
long as they are not violating anyone’s moral rights, we could conclude,
individuals themselves have a moral right to be free from coercive
interference, so that state regulation of non-rights-violating private
discrimination would itself be rights-violating, and thus impermissible.
Still, even if the above argument provides a convincing account of
why we ought not regulate private discrimination, this is still only half of
what is necessary to draw a distinction between the proper legal treatment
of private and commercial discrimination. If, for instance, we believe
that wrongful private discrimination cannot properly be regulated
because it is not rights-violating, why should we not also say that
commercial discrimination, while wrong, is equally non-rights-violating?
Most arguments that commercial discrimination is rights-violating, I
suppose, will rely upon claims either about the more serious harms
caused by commercial discrimination, or about the lesser interest commercial
agents have in the freedom to engage in wrongful discrimination. Part
III of this Article considered and rejected the first consideration. A
response to the second consideration leads to an evaluation of an
argument previously examined in this section—that individuals have an
interest in being free to engage in wrongful discrimination—and leads us
to ask whether this interest is held by commercial actors as well.
The belief that commercial agents do not have such an interest is, I
think, based largely on the belief that the only interest commercial agents
have, qua commercial agents, is profit. This assumption is frequently
reflected in the literature on defining “job-relevant characteristics,”
where the claim is often made that a characteristic is job-relevant if and
only if it affects the employer’s profits.36 On this assumption, commercial
agents do not have an interest in wrongful discrimination except in those
cases where engaging in wrongful discrimination can help to maximize
profit, and in these cases their interest is simply insufficient to justify the
discriminatory acts.
The argument that commercial agents have no interest in wrongful
discrimination, or a nominal interest at most, is reliant upon a sharp
distinction between individuals in their private capacity and individuals
in their capacity as economic agents. In their private capacity, individuals
might have any of a variety of goals, aspirations, and projects, and
34. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., D.W. Haslett, Workplace Discrimination, Good Cause, and Color
Blindness, 36 J. VALUE INQUIRY 73, 76-77 (2002).
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therefore ought to be allowed the freedom to act in ways that contribute
to their freely chosen self-identity. As economic agents, however, individuals
have only one goal—the maximization of profit—and the state may
legitimately prohibit or regulate any activity that is not required for this
goal, if it can serve some legitimate state interest by doing so. This
argument has a certain plausibility to it; a large corporation governed by a
board of directors which serves at the mercy of its stockholders might
fairly be presumed to have the maximization of profit as its primary
interest. Moreover, the cases in which the argument seems least plausible
are cases where the law makes exceptions to allow for commercial
discrimination. For small, family-run businesses, the primary goal might
often be something intangible, such as the continuance of a family
tradition or the provision of meaningful work for people about whom
one cares deeply. Such businesses might well have a multitude of interests
other than profit maximization, some of which might constitute an
interest in wrongful discrimination. But such businesses, unlike large
corporations, are not subject to federal antidiscrimination regulations.
Nor are associations whose primary purpose is judged to be “expressive,”
rather than “economic,” subject to such laws. In her concurring opinion
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
argued that expressive organizations, such as private clubs, might have
the right to discriminate since discrimination might be essential to the
expression of their identity and purpose.37 Economic organizations, on
the other hand, do not have the liberty to discriminate, because their
purpose is assumed to be the production of profit through the provision
of goods and services to the general public as customers.38
Although the distinctions between various types of businesses seem to
neatly correlate with the law’s stance toward discrimination, we must
take care not to exaggerate the justificatory strength of this explanation.
First, not all businesses—even large ones—have the production of profit
as their primary goal. The goals expressed in a company’s mission
statement must be viewed with some skepticism, but there is no doubt
some truth to some companies’ claims to have a core mission of
producing excellence in a certain type of product or strengthening the
community of which they are a part.39 It is, of course, a further question
37. 468 U.S. 609, 631-40 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Ben & Jerry’s, for instance, includes in its mission statement a “social
mission,” which says that the company aims “[t]o operate the company in a way that

1059

ZWOLINSKI.POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

2/26/2007 1:50:25 PM

whether the non-profit-related interests of a company entail an interest in
the liberty to engage in wrongful discrimination, and it is difficult to see
how the relatively benign interests described above would justify such
discrimination. But we should not be as quick as is the argument under
consideration to assume that this is impossible.
Furthermore, even if most businesses do have as their primary aim the
production of profit, this is not necessarily something we should wish to
encourage by incorporating it into our definition of an economic entity.
Part of the problem with business activity exemplified in the wave of
corporate scandals over the last ten years is that individuals have been
too ready to view business as nothing more than a tool for the production
of profit.40 Arguably, these individuals were too successful at divorcing
their personal values from their business life, and were too ready to
sacrifice or ignore those values in order to make a profit.41 And while it
is certainly true that we should not encourage businesses to govern
themselves in discriminatory ways, we should nevertheless also avoid
encouraging them to view themselves as entities standing completely
detached from the values and projects of the individuals who constitute
them. Making room for businesses in which the integration of personal
and economic values is accomplished in a good way might mean making
room for ones in which it is done badly.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article’s quest for an account of the difference between the legal
treatment of private and commercial discrimination has been only partly
successful. Respect for the value of autonomy appears to provide a
better explanation and justification of the disparity than either epistemological
or consequentialist considerations. But there are good reasons to doubt
that even an autonomy-based account can completely vindicate the current
legal practice. That practice seems to presuppose that the value of
autonomy is significantly greater in private than in commercial contexts.
And it is not clear that this assumption is warranted.
Since the current antidiscrimination regulatory scheme cannot be
wholly vindicated by appeal to autonomy or any other plausible values,
actively recognizes the central role that business plays in society by initiating innovative
ways to improve the quality of life locally, nationally & internationally.” Whether or not
one thinks they are successful in this mission, the activities of the company seem to
support that they are sincere in their intentions. Ben & Jerry’s, http://www.benjerrys.
com/our_company/our_mission/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
40. For a popular discussion of some of these recent corporate scandals and the
moral failures behind them, see DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING CULTURE (2004).
41. For a detailed analysis of this divorce in the case of Enron, see BETHANY
MCLEAN & PETER EKLIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2004).
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the legal practice ought to be changed. But the arguments that I have
provided in this Article leave room for discretion in the direction of that
change. That the value of autonomy is not significantly greater in private
than in commercial contexts demonstrates that we cannot appeal to
interests in autonomy to justify differential regulation. But there are two
ways in which we could make regulation nondifferential: we could
regulate commercial discrimination less, or we could regulate private
discrimination more.
Whether it is more appealing to deregulate commercial discrimination
or to begin regulating private discrimination cannot depend solely on the
relative value of autonomy in private and commercial contexts, since, as
I have tried to show, the interests in each context are not as disparate as
has commonly been supposed. Rather, the decision will depend on the
absolute value we assign to autonomy, and the way in which this value
compares with other values at stake in cases of discrimination. How
important is autonomy as a value, and how does it compare with the
negative value of the harms caused by discrimination? I personally assign a
fairly high weight to considerations of autonomy, and this pushes me in
the direction of regulating commercial discrimination less rather than
regulating private discrimination more. But an argument for this belief
is beyond the scope of this paper. My goal here has not been to suggest
a particular way of resolving the inconsistency between the legal
regulation of private and commercial discrimination. My goal has simply
been to point out that there is such an inconsistency, and that it cannot be
completely explained and justified by appeal to any plausible set of
values. Our legal treatment of discrimination must change, but it remains to
be seen exactly how.
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